Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons

Dino Gerardi, Lucas Maestri and Ignacio Monzon

American Economic Review, 2022, vol. 112, issue 5, 1591-1620

Abstract: We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer's payoff shrinks to zero.

JEL-codes: C78 D82 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons (2022)
Working Paper: Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons (2020)
Working Paper: Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons (2013)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201718

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