The Dynamic Consequences of State Building: Evidence from the French Revolution

Cédric Chambru, Emeric Henry and Benjamin Marx

American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 114, issue 11, 3578-3622

Abstract: How do radical reforms shape economic development over time? In 1790, the French Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom's organization to establish new local capitals. In some departments, the choice of local capitals over rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. We study how changes in administrative presence affect state capacity and development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. In the long run, capitals obtain more public goods and grow faster. Our results shed light on the dynamic impacts of state building following one of history's most ambitious administrative reforms.

JEL-codes: D70 H41 H71 O18 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution (2022)
Working Paper: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution (2022)
Working Paper: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution (2022)
Working Paper: The dynamic consequences of state-building: evidence from the French Revolution (2022)
Working Paper: The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution (2021)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220110

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