Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India's Direct Benefit Transfer Policy

Prabhat Barnwal

American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 114, issue 12, 3812-46

Abstract: Targeted price subsidies create a gap between subsidized and unsubsidized prices. The resulting dual pricing can lead to arbitrage opportunities where intermediaries divert subsidized goods to unintended beneficiaries via the black market. I study India's Direct Benefit Transfer policy for cooking fuel subsidies, which altered the existing subsidy program by transferring subsidies directly to beneficiaries' bank accounts. The policy decreased subsidized fuel purchases, indicating a reduction in diversion to the black market. Changes in unsubsidized fuel sales and black market prices provide supporting evidence that leakage was reduced. These results suggest that addressing the underlying perverse incentives in welfare delivery can improve efficiency by curbing leakages.

JEL-codes: D73 I38 O17 Q41 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161864

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