Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections

Niall Hughes

American Economic Review, 2025, vol. 115, issue 12, 4292-4327

Abstract: I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 D81 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220665

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