Employers and Unemployment Insurance Take-Up

Marta Lachowska, Isaac Sorkin and Stephen A. Woodbury

American Economic Review, 2025, vol. 115, issue 8, 2529-73

Abstract: We quantify the employer's role in unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. Employer effects on claiming and appeals are substantial, and those effects are negatively correlated, consistent with appeals deterring claims. Low-wage workers are less likely to claim and more likely to have their claims appealed than median-wage workers. Employer effects help explain these income gradients, so equalizing employer effects on claiming would increase the progressivity of UI. Finally, the main source of targeting error in UI is that eligible workers do not claim.

JEL-codes: J22 J31 J63 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20230195 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.3886/E223361V1 (text/html)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/materials/23620 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/materials/23621 (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:115:y:2025:i:8:p:2529-73

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230195

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().