Test-Optional Admissions

Wouter Dessein, Alex Frankel and Navin Kartik

American Economic Review, 2025, vol. 115, issue 9, 3130-70

Abstract: Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that "society" dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its "disagreement cost." We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.

JEL-codes: I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Test-Optional Admissions (2024)
Working Paper: Test-Optional Admissions (2023)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231407

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