Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts

Andrew Oswald

American Economic Review, 1986, vol. 76, issue 3, 365-77

Abstract: The paper provides evidence to show that many U.S. labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision. A model of an optional contract under asymmetric information, with no private unemployment insurance, is presented. Underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1986
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