Exchange Rate Management: Intertemporal Tradeoffs

Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin

American Economic Review, 1987, vol. 77, issue 1, 107-23

Abstract: Exchange-rate management is possible only if the government pursues consistent monetary and fiscal policies. The authors constructa model in which the real consequences of exchange-rate management depend on the precise time pattern of these policies. The authors study the constraints on feasible policies and the comparative dynamics of disinflation by means of exchange-rate targeting. Theoretical results are consistent with exchange-rate-managed disinflation attempts in Argentina, Chile, and Israel. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Exchange Rate Management: Intertemporal Tradeoffs (1985)
Working Paper: Exchange Rate Management: Intertemporal Tradoffs (1985)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:1:p:107-23

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().