Some Evidence of the Winner's Curse

Stuart E Thiel

American Economic Review, 1988, vol. 78, issue 5, 884-95

Abstract: The mathematical complexity of auction theory has restricted empirical work to qualitative tests of its basic predictions, with mixed results. This paper exploits the theory of order statistics to derive a Nash bid function that is linear in its parameters , allowing direct estimati on by linear least squares. The bid function is fitted to a cross section of auctions for highway construction contracts from thirty-three states, and provides support for several hypotheses of the theory of common-value auctions. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%2819881 ... O%3B2-T&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:5:p:884-95

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().