Imperfect Information and Staggered Price Setting
Laurence Ball () and
Stephen Cecchetti ()
American Economic Review, 1988, vol. 78, issue 5, 999-1018
Many Keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times. This paper presents an explanation for this "staggered" price setting. The authors develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others. This gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs. Staggering can be the equilibrium outcome. In addition, the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Working Paper: Imperfect Information and Staggered Price Setting (1987)
Working Paper: Imperfect information and staggered price setting (1986)
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