The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."

Ariel Rubinstein ()

American Economic Review, 1989, vol. 79, issue 3, 385-91

Abstract: This paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem. Two players have to play one of two possible coordination games. Only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played. It is shown that even if a large (but finite) number of propositions of the type "i knows that j knows that i knows... that the game is G" are true, the game theoretic situation is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge. The example emphasizes the importance of the common knowledge assumption in game theory. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1989
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