Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments

Catherine Eckel and Charles Holt

American Economic Review, 1989, vol. 79, issue 4, 763-73

Abstract: This paper reports results of committee voting experiments with a fixed agenda that specified a sequence of binary decisions. In this particular context, the agenda setter can control the ultimate committee decision if it is known whether voting behavior is myopic or strategic. Subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic voting rules; strategic behavior was more prevalent with experience. The use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1989
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