Quality vs. Quantity in Military Procurement

William P Rogerson

American Economic Review, 1990, vol. 80, issue 1, 83-92

Abstract: It is often argued that the same expenditures on military procurement would produce a more effective defense if larger numbers of less sophisticated (and thus cheaper) weapons were purchased. This paper shows that such a result can occur even if the military derives no private consumption value from technically sophisticated weapons. Rather, the organization of the decision-making process itself can produce this result. This suggests some possible solutions through organizing decision-making in a different fashion. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1990
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