Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value

Daniel A Graham, Robert C Marshall and Jean-Francois Richard

American Economic Review, 1990, vol. 80, issue 3, 493-510

Abstract: Bidder coalitions at English auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction of "knockout." When coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous, nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting. The nested knockout's characteristics are investigated. Within many settings, the authors find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the Shapley value. Incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%2819900 ... O%3B2-S&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:3:p:493-510

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().