The Economics of Product Patents

Michael Waterson

American Economic Review, 1990, vol. 80, issue 4, 860-69

Abstract: This paper develops a model of product patents in which the patent changes the nature of market entry behavior rather than preventing entry entirely. The model incorporates three levels of action, namely, the innovator's patenting decision, the potential entrant's location decision, and possible court action. The analysis demonstrates how the characteristics of the patents system and the enforcement framework can influence rivals' variety choices and, thus, the market equilibrium. It also considers how the system can, in principle, be adjusted to improve social welfare. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%2819900 ... O%3B2-V&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:4:p:860-69

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().