Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara () and
Shmuel Zamir ()
American Economic Review, 1991, vol. 81, issue 5, 1068-95
In an experiment comparing two-person bargaining and multiperson markets in Israel, Japan, the United States, and Yugoslavia, market outcomes converged to equilibrium everywhere, with no payoff-relevant differences between countries. Bargaining outcomes were everywhere different from equilibrium predictions (both in agreements and in the substantial frequency of disagreements) and differences were observed between countries. Because of the experimental design, the fact that the market behavior is the same in all countries supports the hypothesis that the observed differences are not due to differences in languages, currencies, or experimenters, but may tentatively be attributed to cultural differences. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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