Randolph McAfee and
American Economic Review, 1992, vol. 82, issue 3, 579-99
The authors characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.
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Working Paper: Bidding Rings (1990)
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