Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences

Ariel Rubinstein () and Asher Wolinsky

American Economic Review, 1992, vol. 82, issue 3, 600-614

Abstract: This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller-buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This paper explicitly adds a time dimension to an implementation problem and introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation-proofness for the case of time-consuming renegotiation. The main insight gained is that the addition of the time dimension enlarges significantly the set of contracts that can be implemented in a renegotiation-proof manner. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1992
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Related works:
Working Paper: Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences (1990)
Working Paper: Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences (1989)
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