Domestic Politics and International Conflict

Michelle Garfinkel

American Economic Review, 1994, vol. 84, issue 5, 1294-1309

Abstract: This paper explores the interactions between domestic politics and international conflict. The analysis shows that electoral uncertainty associated with competition between political parties, each representing a specific group of the electorate, imparts a negative 'bias' on the nation's military spending, given military spending by other nations. In turn, electoral uncertainty lowers other nations' incentive to arm as well. In this context, democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible 'precommitment' mechanism that reduces the severity of conflict between nations and, thereby, increases the amount of resources available globally for consumption. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Domestic Politics and International Conflict (1992)
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