On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings

Ted Bergstrom ()

American Economic Review, 1995, vol. 85, issue 1, 58-81

Abstract: This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a 'semi-Kantian' utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1995
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