War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework
Gregory Hess () and
Athanasios Orphanides ()
American Economic Review, 1995, vol. 85, issue 4, 828-46
The frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the United States is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president's first term than in other periods. The authors develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events. An incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage, with some probability, his reelection. This obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%2819950 ... O%3B2-D&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:4:p:828-46
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().