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Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study

Haig R Nalbantian and Andrew Schotter

American Economic Review, 1997, vol. 87, issue 3, 314-41

Abstract: This paper presents an experimental examination of a variety of group incentive programs. The authors investigate simple revenue sharing and more sophisticated, target-based systems such as profit sharing or productivity gainsharing, as well as tournament-based and monitoring schemes. Their results can be characterized by three facts: (1) history matters-how a group performs in one incentive scheme depends on its history together under the scheme that preceded it; (2) relative performance schemes outperform target-based schemes; and (3) monitoring can elicit high effort from workers, but the probability of monitoring must be high and, therefore, costly. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (311)

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Working Paper: Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study (1994)
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