The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States: 1890-1939

Miguel Cantillo Simon

American Economic Review, 1998, vol. 88, issue 5, 1077-93

Abstract: This article studies how equity ownership and corporate control were separated in the United States. Initially, railroads and industrial firms were tightly controlled by a few shareholders; this situation was altered in the 1890s by massive mergers and reorganizations, which allowed private banks to control railroads and industrial firms. Between 1912 and 1939, bank control faded away as a result of a political reaction against financial institutions. Using stock-market data from 1914, the author shows that the eviction of banks from corporate boards depressed firm values by about 7 percent and that part of this value came from cartelization. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%2819981 ... O%3B2-F&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:5:p:1077-93

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().