An Economic Theory of GATT
Robert Staiger () and
American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 1, 215-248
The authors propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, they represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, the authors establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, the authors argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes.
JEL-codes: F13 F02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.1.215
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (448) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: An economic theory of GATT (1998)
Working Paper: An Economic Theory of GATT (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:215-248
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().