Competing for Endorsements

Elhanan Helpman and Gene Grossman

American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 3, 501-524

Abstract: Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. The authors examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.501
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competing for Endorsements (1998)
Working Paper: Competing for Endorsements (1996)
Working Paper: Competing for Endorsements (1996)
Working Paper: Competing for Endorsements (1996)
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