The Market for Evaluations

Paul Resnick, Christopher Avery and Richard Zeckhauser

American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 3, 564-584

Abstract: Recent developments in computer networks have driven the cost of distributing information virtually to zero, creating extraordinary opportunities for sharing product evaluations. The authors present pricing and subsidy mechanisms that operate through a computerized market and induce the efficient provision of evaluations. The mechanisms overcome three major challenges: first, evaluations, which are public goods, are likely to be underprovided; second, an inefficient ordering of evaluators may arise; and third, the optimal quantity of evaluations depends on what is learned from the initial evaluations.

JEL-codes: D83 L15 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.564
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

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