The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
Elliott Peranson and
Alvin Roth ()
American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 4, 748-780
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of "core convergence" result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process.
JEL-codes: J44 C78 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.748
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