The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

Elliott Peranson and Alvin Roth

American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 4, 748-780

Abstract: We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of "core convergence" result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process.

JEL-codes: C78 I11 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.748
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (400)

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