An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance
Tomas Philipson () and
John Cawley ()
American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 4, 827-846
This paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world: life insurance. We report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information. We conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market, as in those for most other products.
JEL-codes: G22 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.827
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Working Paper: An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade inInsurance (1997)
Working Paper: An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:4:p:827-846
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