Meetings with Costly Participation

Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, Martin Osborne and Matthew Turner

American Economic Review, 2000, vol. 90, issue 4, 927-943

Abstract: We study a collective decision-making process in which people interested in an issue may participate, at a cost, in a meeting, and the resulting decision is a compromise among the participants' preferences. We show that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme, and when the compromise is the median, the outcome is likely to be random. The model and its equilibria are consistent with evidence on the procedures and outcomes of U.S. regulatory hearings.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.4.927
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (68)

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Working Paper: Meetings with costly participation (1998)
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