EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Economic Integration and Political Disintegration

Enrico Spolaore, Alberto Alesina and Romain Wacziarg

American Economic Review, 2000, vol. 90, issue 5, 1276-1296

Abstract: In a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. Under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural, linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small, homogeneous political jurisdictions. This paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries, and successfully tests two implications of the model. Firstly, the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade. Secondly, the history of nation-state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime.

JEL-codes: F02 F15 F41 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.5.1276
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (369)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.90.5.1276 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Economic Integration and Political Disintegration (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Economic Integration and Political Disintegration (1997) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:5:p:1276-1296

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-24
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:5:p:1276-1296