Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions

Marie Thursby and Richard Jensen

American Economic Review, 2001, vol. 91, issue 1, 240-259

Abstract: Proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act argue that industrial use of federally funded research would be reduced without university patent licensing. Our survey of U.S. universities supports this view, emphasizing the embryonic state of most technologies licensed and the need for inventor cooperation in commercialization. Thus, for most university inventions, there is a moral-hazard problem with inventor effort. For such inventions, development does not occur unless the inventor's income is tied to the licensee's output by payments such as royalties or equity. Sponsored research from the licensee cannot by itself solve this problem.

JEL-codes: O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.1.240
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (427)

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