Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry

Tasneem Chipty

American Economic Review, 2001, vol. 91, issue 3, 428-453

Abstract: I examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry. I assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings, prices, and subscriptions, and I compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets. The results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions. First, integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services, suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators. Second, vertical integration does not harm, and may actually benefit, consumers because of the associated efficiency gains.

JEL-codes: L22 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.428
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (136)

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