Costly Voting

Tilman Börgers ()

American Economic Review, 2004, vol. 94, issue 1, 57-66

Abstract: What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Paretodominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

Date: 2004
Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282804322970706
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Working Paper: Costly Voting (2001)
Working Paper: Costly Voting (2001)
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