Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

James Snyder, Michael M. Ting and Stephen Ansolabehere

American Economic Review, 2005, vol. 95, issue 4, 981-1004

Abstract: Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.

Date: 2005
Note: DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825538
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