Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
Pedro Dal Bó ()
American Economic Review, 2005, vol. 95, issue 5, 1591-1604
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions.
Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014434
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (114) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1591-1604
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().