A Theory of Participation in Elections

Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni

American Economic Review, 2006, vol. 96, issue 4, 1271-1282

Abstract: We analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal. Ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so. Unlike previous duty-based models of participation, in our model an ethical agent\'s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. Our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior. (JEL D72)

Date: 2006
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1271
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (206)

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