Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules

Gilat Levy

American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, issue 1, 150-168

Abstract: In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)

Date: 2007
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.150
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (134)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation, and voting rules (2007)
Working Paper: Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation and voting rules (2005)
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