Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task

Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini

American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, issue 1, 169-179

Abstract: This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort, or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities. The optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous, and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed. But irrespective of the normative conclusion, the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies. (JEL D72, D73, D82)

Date: 2007
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.169
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