Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, issue 5, 1731-1750

Abstract: "Hide-and-seek" games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic "landscapes" that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and econometrically suggests that the deviations are well explained by a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on "level-k" thinking, suitably adapted to nonneutral landscapes. (JEL C72, C92)

JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1731
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (83)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1731 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec07/20050133_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec07/20050133_app.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:1731-1750

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().