Individual Preferences for Giving

Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv and Daniel Markovits

American Economic Review, 2007, vol. 97, issue 5, 1858-1876

Abstract: We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual- level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff- pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

Date: 2007
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1858
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Related works:
Working Paper: Individual Preferences for Giving (2006)
Working Paper: Individual Preferences for Giving (2005)
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