Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 1, 267-93

Abstract: We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72)

JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.267
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (397)

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Working Paper: Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions (2006)
Working Paper: Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions (2006)
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