EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show

Thierry Post, Martijn J. van den Assem, Guido Baltussen () and Richard Thaler

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 1, 38-71

Abstract: We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show "Deal or No Deal" and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. (JEL D81)

JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.38
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (160) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.1.38 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar08/20060455_data.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:38-71

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-05
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:38-71