Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment

Fuhito Kojima

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 1, 561-62

Abstract: Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate the normative criteria for allocating policy tasks to bureaucrats versus politicians. While they establish criteria with respect to a number of parameters, they do not give a criterion with respect to the degree of imperfect monitoring. We establish an unambiguous criterion about imperfect monitoring. (JEL D72, D73)

JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.561
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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