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Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections

Marco Battaglini (), Rebecca Morton () and Thomas Palfrey

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 2, 194-200

JEL-codes: D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.194
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