Matching with Contracts: Comment

John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 3, 1189-94

Abstract: Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts phrased in terms of hospitals and doctors, which subsumes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models. They show that a stable allocation exists if contracts are substitutes for each hospital. They further claim that if a hospital's preferences violate the substitutes condition, there exist singleton preferences for the other hospitals and doctors such that no stable allocation exists. We show this last claim does not hold in general. We further present a weaker condition that is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable allocations.

JEL-codes: C78 D86 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.1189
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.3.1189 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june08/20070593_app.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:1189-94

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().