All-or-Nothing Monitoring

Rui Zhao

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 4, 1619-28

Abstract: A principal can observe both the output and input of an agent who works at a job involving multiple tasks. We provide a simple theory that explains why it may be optimal for the principal to use only an output-based incentive contract, even though the principal can monitor the agent's actions perfectly in all but one task and knows exactly which action is optimal for each task. (JEL D82, D86, M54)

JEL-codes: D82 D86 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1619
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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