Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile

Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 5, 1737-65

Abstract: Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)

JEL-codes: D72 N46 O13 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.1737
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (137)

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Working Paper: Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile (2006)
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