EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries

Adi Brender () and Allan Drazen

American Economic Review, 2008, vol. 98, issue 5, 2203-20

Abstract: We test whether good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries independent of income level, level of democracy, or government or electoral system. In developed countries and old democracies, deficits in election years or over the term of office reduce reelection probabilities. Higher growth rates over the term raise reelection probabilities only in developing countries and new democracies. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in developed countries. These effects are both statistically significant and quite substantial quantitatively. (JEL D72, E62, H62, O47)

JEL-codes: D72 E62 H62 O47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.2203
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (330)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.5.2203 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec08/20060492_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/dec08/20060492_app.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:5:p:2203-20

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:5:p:2203-20