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Peers at Work

Alexandre Mas and Enrico Moretti

American Economic Review, 2009, vol. 99, issue 1, 112-45

Abstract: We study peer effects in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team. Using high-frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain, we find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him. Additionally, workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact. We conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free-riding externalities that are built into many workplaces. (JEL J24, L81, M54)

JEL-codes: J24 L81 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.112
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (691)

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Working Paper: Peers at Work (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Peers at Work (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Peers at Work (2006) Downloads
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