One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry
Ted Bergstrom (),
Rodney Garratt () and
Damien Sheehan-Connor ()
American Economic Review, 2009, vol. 99, issue 4, 1309-34
Stem cell transplants save lives of many patients with blood diseases. Donation is painful, but rarely has lasting adverse effects. Patients can accept transplants only from donors with compatible immune systems. Those lacking a sibling match must seek donations from the general population. The probability that two unrelated persons are compatible is less than 1/10,000. Health authorities maintain a registry of several million genetically tested potential donors who agree to donate if asked. We find that the benefits of adding registrants of every race exceed costs. We also explore the peculiar structure of voluntary public good provision that faces potential donors. (JEL D64, H41, I11)
JEL-codes: D64 H41 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1309
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry (2008)
Working Paper: One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:4:p:1309-34
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().